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Abstract:  
 
In this paper we analyze the effects of a monetary policy shock on Mexican unemployment 
rates.  Unlike previous studies we re-estimate unemployment rates so that these alternative 
rates are comparable to those of the OECD member countries.  We find that in response to 
tightening monetary policy, unemployment increases with a characteristic hump-shaped 
pattern found in other studies.  Our empirical results indicate that unemployment elasticity 
is low and yet the velocity of adjustment to return to the initial point is rather high.  We 
interpret these findings as being the result of two characteristics of Mexico’s labor market: (i) 
high labor regulation (which includes labor intervention in hiring-firing decisions), and (ii) 
the existence of a large informal sector and low enforcement of labor regulation.   
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1. Introduction. 
 
By all accounts Mexico’s monetary policy for the last 25 years has been successful in 
achieving price stability. In effect, inflation has declined from a monthly average rate of 4.3% 
during the 80s to 1.5% during the 90s to 0.4% during the first seven years of the new 
millennium.  The prevailing view is that price stabilization is a necessary condition for 
expanding production, fostering the development of financial markets, and improving both 
public finances and income distribution.1   
To pursue price stability, Mexico’s monetary authorities have used different monetary 
instruments going from exchange rate control to base money control to inflation targeting.  
The latter two were implemented after the crisis of December 1994.  To achieve its 
inflationary targets, Mexico’s central bank maintained a policy of controlling the amount of 
money available to commercial banks through their reserves, which resulted in increases of 
the domestic interest rates.  Higher interest rates, in turn, resulted in contractions of the 
aggregate demand that lowered domestic inflation.  In an open economy, with high capital 
mobility and flexible exchange rates, higher domestic interest rates further lower the 
inflation rate through the appreciation of the domestic currency: an appreciated domestic 
currency not only restrains exports, but also lowers the domestic price of the imported goods. 
Even though it has been recognized the impact of Mexico’s tight monetary policy on 
production, up to now there has not been a thorough discussion about how the former has 
affected labor market performance.  This is a major shortcoming in the current research 
agenda in Mexico because it overlooks the cost of achieving such price stability in terms of 
workers’ welfare.  Even if one were to recognize that price stability is a necessary condition 
for economic growth in the long run, we should not overlook the short and medium run costs 
on workers´ wellbeing.  
                                                          
1 For example, Banxico (2002) and Grier and Grier (2006) analyze the costs of inflation on Mexico’s economic 
growth.  
http://www.banxico.org.mx/documents/%7B15AA921B-8C80-3651-02F2-B0AE5A7BB9E6%7D.pdf  
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Nevertheless, there are several studies that have measured the impact of output changes 
on employment (or unemployment) in less industrialized countries.  For example, 
Loboguerrero and Panizza (2009) find that, compared to industrialized countries, Latin 
American economies transmit their macroeconomic instability to their labor markets more 
through fluctuations in real wages than through fluctuations in employment.2  Loboguerrero 
and Panizza’s conclusions are similar to those of Gonzalez-Anaya (2002) in the sense that in 
Latin America, changes in output has been absorbed more through changes in real wages 
than through changes in employment (or unemployment).  He also finds that within Latin 
American countries, Mexico presents one of the highest wage elasticity while exhibiting one 
the lowest unemployment elasticity.3  The estimates of output elasticity of unemployment 
for Mexico’s are less conclusive however.  Chavarin (2001) finds that a one percentage point 
of Mexico’s output decline is associated with a 0.416 increase in unemployment, whereas 
Loria and Ramos (2007), using a different estimation technique, also find that output 
elasticity of unemployment is about 0.481.  Compared to the rest of Latin American 
economies, these estimates are larger than most of Latin American economies.4   
We explore further the question of how responsive unemployment rate is to 
macroeconomic shocks in Mexico, a country that began its successful price stabilization 
program during the second half of the 1980s.  We depart from the studies already mentioned 
in that we consider that much of the output shocks were caused by the anti-inflationary 
policy that Mexico’s government has implemented since the late eighties.  However, 
monetary policy is not exogenous, but rather depends on inflationary expectations.  
The theoretical model used to carry out the empirical analysis rests on the assumption 
that money is non-neutral; that is, we argue that changes in unemployment rates can be 
partly explained by monetary policy implemented to control inflation.  Our central argument 
is that by affecting output, monetary policy has some impact on unemployment rates.  Our 
analysis involves the estimation of a Structural VAR model (SVAR).  Variance 
                                                          
2 Macroeconomic instability measured by output volatility.  
3 However, there is some evidence that countries that engaged in price stabilization, and to the extent that 
achieved lower inflation, showed declining wage elasticity at the expense of higher unemployment elasticity; 
that is, there is some evidence that those elasticities might be declining. 
4 Table 2B in Loria et al (2007).  
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decomposition shows which shocks have caused movements in the variables during the 
sample period, while the impulse response functions contain information about the 
magnitude and duration of the effect of a specific structural shock.  
An additional difference with previous studies about unemployment is that the 
empirical analysis considers both the official unemployment rate and an alternative one 
following the definition used by the CPS of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The latter as 
a response to some criticisms made to the official unemployment rates.   
Our results indicate that when using the alternative unemployment rate, tightening 
monetary policy increases unemployment rates with a characteristic hump-shaped pattern 
found in Alexius and Holmlund (2007) and Ravn and Simonelli (2008).  The unemployment 
rate reaches its maximum level after the second quarter at a level 0.26 points above its 
original level, and then it slowly reverts back to its original level.  Error variance 
decomposition results indicate that the monetary policy shock accounts for 3 to 27 percent of 
the fluctuation in unemployment.  When we use the official unemployment rate however, 
monetary policy shocks do not have much impact on unemployment rates.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a short summary of the main 
ideas of the Keynesian argument about the relationship between monetary policy and 
unemployment.  Section 3 reviews the monetary policies followed by Mexican authorities 
during the period of analysis.  Section 4 presents some key characteristics of the Mexican 
labor market, and introduces an alternative indicator of unemployment rates.  Section 5 
discusses the model specification and describes the data.  Section 6 presents the main 
empirical results, while section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Is money neutral?  
Discussions about money non-neutrality can be traced back to Cantillon’s Essay 
published in the first half of the 1700s5.  His argument was that under the gold standard 
increases in the money supply would encourage higher spending, which in turn would 
stimulate production.  This positive effect on production however is short lived for higher 
                                                          
5 Cantillon (1730) “Essay on the nature of the commerce in general”. 
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demand would also induce higher prices which in turn would have a negative impact on 
production.  We find the same argument in Hume’s (1752) paper about money.  His view was 
later retaken by Newcomb (1885) and Fisher (1911) and became what now is known as the 
Quantitative Theory of Money.   
Money’s non-neutrality, on the other hand, is a key feature in Keynesian economics.  
Keynes’s view about the impact of money on real variables is found in his General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money.  Central to the argument is the role played by domestic 
interest rates in inducing changes to aggregate demand. Interest rate in the Keynesian 
framework is the reward for getting ride-off of liquidity.  To the extent that the interest rate 
affects the marginal efficiency of capital which, in turn, determines investment, changes in 
the quantity of money would affect output and employment.6  In Keynes’ view interest rate 
partly depends on the state of liquidity preference and partly on the quantity of money so 
that changes in the quantity of money would induce changes in the interest rates, ceteris 
paribus.  Chick (1983), in turn, argues that interest rates would be affected by open market 
operations or by variations in banks’ reserves or reserve requirements designed to affect 
liquidity and or the supply of credit.  
Thus, within the Keynesian perspective there is a consensus that increases (decreases) 
in the interest rates induce reductions (increases) in the aggregate demand which would, in 
turn, result in reductions (increases) in output and employment.  Given the capacity of 
interest rates to affect output and unemployment, the government can use the monetary 
policy to induce changes in the domestic interest rates to achieve some specific goals.  It is 
precisely money’s non neutrality which allows the government to achieve some specific 
goals.  If inflation is assumed to be caused by an excess demand, then higher interest rates 
can be used to control inflation through the restrain of aggregate demand.  Furthermore, in 
an open economy with high capital mobility, higher interest rates would induce appreciation 
of the domestic currency.  This in turn would induce not only lower price increase but also a 
further contraction of aggregate demand.  In sort, a policy prescription from this framework 
to reduce inflation is to increase domestic interest rate; thus squeezing aggregate demand 
which, in turn, would reduce output and increase unemployment. 
                                                          
6 The overall impact on aggregate demand is further strengthened by the responsiveness of consumption to 
changes on investment.   
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Lipsey (1960) and Samuelson and Solow (1960) formalized Phillips’ (1958) initial 
findings about unemployment rates and wage inflation and contended that there was a stable 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment rates.  However, the notion of a stable 
Phillips curve was criticized by Friedman (1968; 1976) for not introducing workers’ reaction 
to higher price levels into the model.  Friedman further argued that inflation would persist as 
long as unemployment was below its natural rate and inflation expectations were positive.  
Lucas (1973), for example, did not find evidence of a tradeoff between output and 
inflation for a sample of 15 countries.  
The analysis of inflation stabilization has led various strand of research.  One of them 
involves discussions about its impact on output volatility (Taylor, 1994).  In effect, Taylor 
suggested that monetary authority’s efforts to keep prices stable may cause production to 
fluctuate more, while attempts to smooth production cycle may induce higher price 
volatility.  Another one entails discussions on the existence of the Phillips curve.  Be this the 
Traditional Phillips Curve (TPC) based on adaptive expectations or the New Phillips Curve 
(NPC) based on forward looking agents.7   
A conclusion we can draw from this review is that theoretically there strong arguments 
to expect some impact of monetary policy on unemployment; at least, in the short and 
medium term.  A related question is how strong the effect on unemployment is, given the 
characteristics of Mexico’s labor market.  Furthermore, to the extent that a reduction of 
inflation expectations is a key factor for successful price stabilization, economic policies also 
involve control of fiscal deficits.  In section 5 we present the econometric model that 
summarizes the main ideas presented here.  
 
3.-  Mexico’s Monetary and Fiscal Policies. 
 
Since the late fifties and early sixties, inflation has become one of the major concerns of 
both industrialized and emerging economies.  Friedman (1976) illustrated the negative impact 
of both high inflation and inflation volatility on economic performance.  High inflation, for 
example, could reduce political cohesiveness since it overruns institutional arrangements and 
                                                          
7 See for example the special issue on the Phillips Curve of the Journal of Monetary Economics  (1999), Vol. 44, 
No 2. 
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financial contracts based on a “normal,” long term price level.  Higher price volatility, on the 
other hand, by increasing uncertainty lowers economic efficiency and renders market prices a 
less efficient system for coordinating economic activity.  For all these negative effects on 
economic growth, governments have considered inflation to be the most important problem 
to solve.  
The empirical evidence against the negative impact of inflation on growth is mixed.  
For example, a recent study by Grier and Grier (2006) found that inflation uncertainty have a 
negative and significant effect on Mexico’s growth; moreover, higher average inflation rates 
induces higher inflation uncertainty which further affects growth.  However, Risso and 
Sanchez (2009) argued that inflation has a positive impact of growth as long as it does not 
reach its threshold level of 9 percent.  Inflation rates greater that this threshold level have 
negative effect of growth.  
Our analysis begins in 19878, in the aftermath of a period characterized by high 
macroeconomic instability.  That particular year, inflation reached a historical high of 140% 
annually. To face this situation, the Mexican authorities designed a stabilization program 
centered on a temporary freeze of wages and administered prices in the context of an 
Economic Solidarity Pact.  However, a few weeks after the launching of the program, in 
early March 1988, the nominal exchange rate was fixed and became the main anchor of the 
anti-inflationary effort.  
As most of the prices and wages control were gradually lifted, the anti-inflationary 
program evolved into a more orthodox strategy in which fiscal adjustment and exchange rate 
anchor became the main policy elements.  Between 1988 and 1994 the Mexican authorities 
made several modifications to the exchange rate system, moving first to a regime based on a 
preannounced rate of devaluation (where the rate of devaluation was set below the rate of 
inflation).  In November 1991, Mexico’s Central Bank implemented a narrow exchange rate 
band with a sliding ceiling.   
Throughout most of this period, Mexico’s managed exchange rate regime was 
supported by prudent fiscal and monetary policy.  Between 1992 and October 1993 the 
nominal exchange rate was remarkably stable.  After 18 months, all these policies provided 
                                                          
8 This section draws heavily in Messmacher and Werner (2002) and Sanchez (2005).  
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their expected results: inflation fell drastically to less than 20 percent.  But from then on, the 
pace of disinflation became sluggish.   
In December of 1994, Mexico faced a serious balance of payment and financial crisis, 
when under severe pressure in the foreign exchange market, the Central Bank was no longer 
able to defend the predetermined US Dollar-Peso parity and let the peso float.  As the peso 
was left to float, it depreciated immediately and domestic prices increased steadily at a 
monthly rate of 3.6% throughout 1995.  The interbank interest rate increased from 17 percent 
in the third week of August 1994 to 110 percent in the third week of March 1995, which 
induced a severe slump of the real economy.   
The new anti-inflationary program adopted in early in 1995 stabilized relatively quickly 
nominal variables.  Despite this rebound, output and employment suffered considerably: 
output fell by 6.2 per cent, whereas open unemployment went up to 7.6 percent by the mid 
1995. 
The evolution of monetary policy since the adoption of the floating exchange rate 
regime has included the following main elements.  First, adoption of quantitative objectives 
based on aggregates such as the monetary base.  This was predominant during 1995-1997.  
Second, in early 1998 the central bank announced a change in its strategy: it began inflation 
targeting.  In particular, the 1999 monetary program set an annual inflation goal of no more 
than 13% for the National Consumer Price Index and proposed, as commitment for the next 
five years, a gradual approximation to the inflation rate of the country’s main trading 
partners.  In 2001, the monetary policy’s goal was to stabilize the National Consumer Price 
Index at 3 percent.  However, by mid 2002 the Central Bank announced that this 
commitment would have a margin of tolerance of   1 percentage point.  
Gaytán and Gonzalez (2006) found that there has been a change in the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy as a result of the change in monetary policy (the use of 
inflation targeting).   
 
4.- The Mexican Labor Market  
 
The purpose of this section is twofold.  First, to describe some characteristics of 
Mexico’s labor market so that we have a better understanding about its employment 
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dynamics and how unemployment might respond to policy shocks. Second, in light to some 
criticisms made to the official unemployment rate, we estimate an alternative unemployment 
rate. 
 
4.1 About the nature of Mexico’s labor market 
 
There are two contrasting views about the nature of Mexican labor market.  On the one 
hand, there is the idea that Mexico’s labor market is heavily regulated by laws that impede 
employment creation (Heckman and Pagés, 2001; Gill et al, 2001).  In this case, output growth 
would not translate into employment growth but rather into real wage changes.  It is argued 
that job security provisions (which includes severance payments) increases dismissal costs to 
the firms.  These costs discourage firms to fire workers whenever there is a negative shock 
and reduce job creation in expansions.  Heckman and Pagés (2001) found that Mexico 
exhibits one of the highest indexes of job security within Latin American countries which 
implies that it has one of the most regulated markets in the region.  
Employment rigidity can also be increased by the existence of labor unions.  Maloney 
(2009), for example, argues that Mexican unions value more employment over wages so that 
output fluctuations affect more wage rates than employment.  This can be explained for 
several reasons.  First, Mexico has no unemployment insurance; hence, workers value more 
employment stability over wages.  Second, since the early twenty century, major unions have 
had a long-standing and close relationship with the government and have cooperated in 
implementing policies to reduce inflationary pressures.  In particular, since the late 1980s 
unions have settled, on average, for nominal wage growth below inflation rates.  Third, 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s job growth was slow relative to population growth.  
These elements explain why output fluctuations are more correlated with real wage 
fluctuations than with employment changes.  They might also explain Alcaraz’s conclusion 
that real wages do not depend on unemployment in the formal sector (Alcaraz, 2009).  
On the other side of the debate, there is the notion that even though Mexico’s labor 
market is heavily regulated by labor laws, in practice the compliance to such laws is very low.  
Moreover, since the late 1980s there have been introduced a number of schemes that have 
added employment flexibility (Marshall, 2004).  Among these schemes we find the increased 
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use of short term contracts to avoid job stability.  This is particularly true for the in-bound 
and service sectors, the fastest growing sectors within the Mexican economy since the late 
1980s.  
Furthermore, Alcaraz, et al (2008) contend that the employment share of the services 
sector has increased at the expense of Mexico’s manufacturing employment since 2000.  
According to these authors, this employment re-composition has implied not only an 
increase of the service sector’s employment share but an increase of the informal sector as 
well.  The upward trend of employment in the informal sector has occurred despite the 
existing wage differential between formal and informal employment.  They also found 
evidence that the transition rate between formal and informal employment is higher than the 
one existing between manufactures and services sectors.  Alcaraz et al (2008) point out that 
higher mobility between formal and informal sectors (and vice-versa) would indicate the 
existence of institutional labor market rigidities in Mexico’s formal sector. 
The existence of a large informal sector9 somewhat offsets employment rigidities that 
arise due to labor regulations in the formal sector.  The question is whether or not this 
offsetting force is strong enough so that we can characterize Mexican labor market as being 
fairly flexible.  
In short, within Mexico’s labor market coexist two types of factors.  On the one hand, 
there are some labor market institutions that add employment rigidity while adding real 
wage flexibility; namely, labor regulation and unions.  On the opposite side, we find 
elements that offset the negative effect of the latter on employment flexibility.  Among these 
we find the low enforcement of labor regulations and the informal sector.  A priori we do not 
know which of these two types of factors have a stronger effect on employment flexibility.   
 
4.2 How accurate is Mexico’s unemployment rate?  
 
For an outsider, Mexico’s low official unemployment rates represent a puzzle.  How 
could a country with such low rates of unemployment grow so little? In effect, Mexico’s 
unemployment rate for the last twenty years or so has been on average one of the lowest 
among OECD members, about 3.5%, only Luxembourg and South Korea present lower 
                                                          
9 Alcaraz (2009) argues that it can be as large as 40% of the Mexican labor force. 
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unemployment rates.10  Yet its average annual growth rate of per capita GDP has been 1.2%, a 
much lower rate of growth than South Korea’s 5.8%, a country with similar unemployment 
rates. 11  
Several authors have argued that Mexico’s low official unemployment rates can be 
explained by a combination of several elements; namely, (i) the lack of unemployment 
benefits, (ii) the existence of a fairly remunerated, and large, informal sector, (iii) the 
existence of high rates of labor migration to the United States, and (iv) the exclusion of rural 
areas in estimating unemployment rates where unemployment is higher than in urban areas.  
We argue however that although some of these factors might explain partially the low 
rates, a significant explanation is found on some methodological issues relating the 
estimation of unemployment rates.  Fleck and Sorentino (1994) and Martin (2000), for 
example, argue that when following the concepts and methodology used by the US labor 
Statistics, Mexican unemployment rates increase between 40 and 70 percent.  Revenga and 
Riboud (1993), on the other hand, reach to the same conclusion though for a different reason: 
the official statistics do not take into account temporary unemployed, or unemployed who 
were not included in the surveys.12 
To tackle one the main criticisms to official statistics we re-estimate Mexico’s 
unemployment rate.  We use the quarterly National Survey of Urban Employment and 
followed the CPS criteria.  First, we consider only workers between the age of 16 and 75 
years.13  Second, to obtain the overall unemployment rate, we utilize the original 16 cities 
included in the ENEU only.  Third, we do not consider as employed, people who are on 
strike, unemployed for shortage of working capital, raw materials or lack of repairs.  We also 
exclude people working without pay up to fifteen hours a week. That is, they are not 
included as part of the Economically Active Population (EAP) or as employed. The resulting 
                                                          
10 During 1987-2004 OECD members had an average rate of 5.93% (http://stats.oecd.org).  
11 Between 1987 and 2004, Mexico’s total real GDP grew at an annual average rate of 3.01, while population grew 
at an annual average of 1.8%.  South Korea, on the other hand, grew at an annual rate of 6.2% and its population 
growth was 0.33% during the same period (Data on output comes from OECD web page, http://stats.oecd.org; 
whereas data on population growth comes from United Nations World Population Propsects: 2006 revision – 
Table A.8). 
12 This is particularly relevant when a person is out of job and not looking for one in one survey but before the 
next survey is carried out, he or she finds a job and thus appears as employed.   
13 Previous to 2005, Mexican statistics considered people working form the age of 12.  In 2005 and as a response to 
criticisms, the lower age limit was raised to 14.  
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series allows a direct comparison between Mexico´s unemployment rates to the OECD 
countries. 
 
Figure 1: Mexico: Official and Alternative Unemployment 
 
Source: INEGI (ENEU, several years) 
 
The evolution of official and alternative unemployment rates are displayed in figure 1.  
Compared to the official rates, the alternative measure is about 100% higher, i.e., the average 
rate of unemployment for the period 1987 - 2004 goes up from 3.4 percent to 6.4 percent.  The 
overall behavior of both series however, is somewhat similar.  The main difference occurs 
during the period previous to the 1995 crisis.  During the early 90s both series show a slight 
upward trend which reaches its highest value by the end of 1995.  In 1996 begins a period 
where the unemployment rate declines rapidly, so that by the end of 2000 had reached their 
respective low rates of unemployment.  This recovery of the unemployment rate is short 
lived however, for in the next year unemployment begins a new upward trend.  Both 
unemployment series exhibit large cyclical fluctuations as well as short run variations.   
We now turn to the specification of the econometric model and its estimation. 
 
5. Model Specification. 
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We use a structural vector autorregresion model (SVAR) to analyze the dynamic 
impact of monetary policy on unemployment14.  The analysis is complemented by the 
estimation of the impulse response function and variance decomposition.   
Thus, 
 
                                                                                (1) 
 
where    is a (nx1) vector of endogenous variables, A is a (nxn) matrix of coefficients 
describing the contemporaneous correlation among the variables; B(L) is a (nxn) matrix of 
polynomials in the lag operator, L; and     is a (nx1) vector of structural shocks. Thus, each of 
the system’s variables can be influenced by its own idiosyncratic shocks and by shocks from 
the other variables. The matrices A and B(L) determine how shocks to each variable are 
transmitted through the system, both contemporaneously and in subsequent periods. The 
reduced form of the SVAR can be expressed by  
 
    
            
                                                           (2) 
 
where     
     describes the relationship between the model’s reduced and structural 
shocks.  In fact, the model’s reduced shocks are linear combinations of the pure structural 
shocks. 
A necessary condition for establishing the relationships between the reduced and 
structural shocks is that the system be identified.  As is well known, to identify the structural 
model from an estimated VAR, it is necessary to impose          restrictions on the 
structural model.  
Several different methods of identification are available in the literature. Blanchard 
and Diamond (1989) used a priori assumptions about the signs of structural parameters to 
identify the range of values of matrix A, consistent with the data. Shapiro and Watson (1988) 
and Blanchard and Quah (1989) used assumptions about long run multipliers to achieve 
                                                          
14 Another way to perform the analysis is through the use of a Markov-switching vector autoregression model. 
However, the degrees of freedom are quickly eroded due the number of observations in our sample. 
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identification.  Blanchard and Quah (1989) start with orthogonal shocks.  In a two variable 
model, one is assumed to represent a supply shock and the other one a demand shock. For 
example, productivity shocks are separated from demand shocks by assuming that demand 
shocks do not affect real output in the long run while productivity shocks do.  On the other 
hand, Sims (1980) argues that identification is achieved using short run restrictions on the 
timing of the effects of shocks only, i. e., monetary policy shocks are frequently identified by 
assuming that changes in the interest rate does not affect inflation in the same period since 
prices are sticky and respond with a delay.  In our analysis we will use a combination of the 
two approaches to identify our model.  
 
5.1.- Definition of variables and data   
 
Our SVAR model includes three endogenous variables: unemployment (both the 
official and the alternative rates), an indicator of the monetary policy and output gap.  We 
include the latter since labor demand is a derived demand that depends on output’s 
fluctuations.  The estimation also includes three exogenous variables that are thought to 
affect unemployment: the US output, an indicator of fiscal policy and labor productivity15.  
In this work we use available quarterly data from the first quarter of 1987 to the fourth 
quarter of 2004, a total of 74 observations.  The Mexican output gap is estimated from the 
real GDP (collected from INEGI), whereas the US output gap is calculated from the US real 
GDP (taken from OECD’s main economic indicators).  The indicator of Mexico’s fiscal 
policy is measured by the fiscal surplus while labor productivity is measured by output per 
worker.  
It should be noted that both unemployment series were seasonally adjusted using 
Tramo/Seats.  By the same token, the Mexican and foreign output gap were obtained using 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter with λ=1600 after seasonally adjusted using Tramo/Seats.  We 
now discuss in more detail the variables included in the SVAR model.   
 
                                                          
15 That these three variables are exogenous was proved following Hyeon-Seung H.(2005).        
            . Values in parentheses refer to the degree of freedom and those in square brackets are the 
marginal significance levels of the test.    
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5.1.1 Indicator of monetary policy 
 
As argued in section 3, our sample period covers both fixed and floating exchange rate 
regimes; thus we need a single time series that captures the effects of monetary policy on the 
economy in both regimes.  To solve this problem, we use the Monetary Condition Index 
(MCI) that captures the total effect (direct and indirect) of the exchange rate and the interest 
rate on domestic output.  
MCI is typically measured as the weighted sum of the change in the short term 
interest rate and exchange rate relative to a base period, with the weights being generally 
derived from empirical econometric models reflecting estimated impact of these variables on 
output or inflation16. Thus, MCI encapsulates the extent of internal and external influences 
on the overall monetary conditions of a country. Higher weight of the exchange rate relative 
to that of the interest rate in the MCI would indicate greater importance of the exchange rate 
relative to the interest rate in influencing aggregate demand or prices.   
MCI can be used for monetary policy in different ways; as an operational target, as a 
monetary policy rule or as an indicator of policy stance. In our work we use MCI as an 
indicator of policy stance. For instance, MCI calculated relative to a base period indicates 
whether policy has become “tighter” or “easier” relative to that base period. In this construct, 
the absolute value of the MCI does not offer any meaningful interpretation; rather it is the 
direction of the movements which reveals the change in policy stance.  
Using the estimated coefficients of interest rate and exchange rate variables in the 
cointegration vector of aggregated output system, the ratio or weight of the MCI index turn 
out to be 1:4.2 which indicates that the exchange rate affects into aggregate output is stronger 
than interest rate effects.17 This is consistent with the high degree of openness (measured by 
                                                          
16 We derived the relative weights of interest rate and exchange rate for MCI from aggregate demand equation. 
The literature has suggested three approaches To estimate the relative weights: (i) single equation approach by 
estimating either output or price equation; (ii) trade share approach by estimating long-rung exports to GDP 
ratio equation and (iii) multiple equation approach by estimating the system of equations through 
cointegration. We used Vector Autoregressive (VAR) and Johansen cointegration models to avoid omitted 
variable bias, dynamic exogeneity and feedback problems. The contegration approach takes care of these 
problems.  
17 It should be noted that recent empirical studies have shown that there has been a change in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy since 2001 as a consequence of the new anti-inflationary strategy based on 
inflation targeting.  Gaytán and González (2006) argue that output and inflation have become more sensitive to 
interest rates whereas real exchange rate has become less important.  
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the value of trade as proportion of GDP) that Mexican economy shows during our period of 
analysis. Monitoring MCI is one possible way of incorporating the exchange rate directly 
into the framework of monetary policy; therefore, the greater the openness of an economy, 
the higher the weight of the exchange rate relative to that of interest rate.   
 
5.1.2 The domestic output gap 
 
In our analysis, the gap between aggregated demand and potential output18, is a key 
driving variable in our dynamic analysis.  Understanding where the economy is going 
requires a good idea of where the starting point is.  The basic problem is that potential output 
and hence the output gap are not directly observable.  We consider that potential output is 
best characterized as being driven by a stochastic process and is obtained using the Hodrick-
Prescott (H-P) filter.  The rationale for using the H-P filter is that it can help decompose the 
observed shock into a permanent (supply) and temporary (demand) component19.  Thus the 
domestic output gap,   , is estimated as          , where    is the permanent component 
of output, estimated through the HP filter, y is observed real GDP. 
 
5.1.3 The index of Fiscal Policy. 
 
We noted previously that Mexico’s stabilization program included the reduction of 
fiscal deficits.  To control for the impact of fiscal policy on unemployment, we introduce the 
primary structural surplus.  The primary structural surplus is calculated as the difference 
between the budgetary income and expenses, adjusting the fiscal component of the budgetary 
income.  Following the work of Villagómez and Pastor (2007) we adjust the indicator of 
fiscal policy for business cycle fluctuations and seasonal patterns20. This adjustment is made 
                                                          
18 Potential output is defined as the maximum level of output that can be produced without creating pressure for 
inflation to accelerate. 
19 Choosing a large λ in the H-P filter imposes the view that supply shocks are deterministic and that 
variations in output come almost entirely from demand shocks. Choosing λ to be very small imposes the view 
that most variation in output is also variations in potential or trend output and hence is driven by supply 
shocks.  
 
20 According to Hayford (2005) “the logic behind structural measures is that one problem in identifying the 
effect of fiscal policy is that government revenues and transfer payments respond to fluctuations in economic 
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by multiplying income from taxes by the ratio of potential GDP to actual GDP, raised to the 
power of the tax-income elasticity with respect to actual GDP.  To construct the primary 
structural surplus, budgetary data was used and collected from Secretaria de Hacienda y 
Crédito Público (SHCP).  
 
5.1.4 US output  
 
Several studies have shown the degree to which the Mexican business cycles are highly 
co-dependent of the US business cycles.  This result is more than evident given that more 
than 90% exports goes to the US economy.  To control for such an impact on unemployment 
we include the US output gap,    as the indicator of foreign demand in our model.  Thus, 
        , where    is the potential US output, estimated through the HP filter, q is the 
observed US output.  
 
5.1.5 Labor productivity 
 
It has been argued that labor saving technical change can affect unemployment rates; 
thus, to control for such changes in technical efficiency we introduce labor productivity in 
our model as an exogenous variable.  Labor productivity is measured by the output per 
employed worker. 
 
6. Empirical analysis21 
 
6.1 Identification 
 
In this section we first justify some of the assumptions made to obtain the estimated 
parameters.  Our SVAR model includes three endogenous variables: Monetary Policy (MCI), 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
activity as well as potentially caused fluctuation in economic activity. One way to deal with this problem is to 
control for the effect of cyclical fluctuations by using cyclical adjusted or structural measures of fiscal policy.  
21 We also included a one lag inflation rate as a proxy for expected inflation. While the one lag inflation rate 
variable is statistically significant only in the MCI equation, including this variable does not have any 
qualitative effect on the rest of the results (see Table A1 at the appendix). Therefore, we use a parsimonious 
model without expected inflation.     
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Domestic output gap    ) and Unemployment (u), and three exogenous variables: US output gap 
   , Productivity (p) and Fiscal policy (g).  The order of the matrix A is as follows.  First we 
include monetary policy, we place excess domestic demand second and then the 
unemployment rate.  
Monetary policy is identified by assuming that changes in interest rate do not affect the 
excess demand in the same period since prices are sticky and respond with a delay. This 
implies that         In section 4.1 we presented some stylized facts about Mexico labor 
market.  Given the existence of a large informal sector and the high degree of transition 
between formal and informal employment, unemployment rates would not necessary change 
as output changes.  Output fluctuations would induce flows between the formal and informal 
sectors so that unemployment rate would remain somewhat rigid. This translates into 
        The third restriction is derived from the fact that the monetary policy does not 
depend on unemployment, i.e.,      .  
 
6.2 SVAR estimation. 
 
Given that both unemployment series (the official and alternative ones) are non 
stationary22 over the sample period; and since we want to determine the persistence of 
monetary policy shocks rather than assume that the effects are permanent, we added a 
deterministic time trend to the model to yield a stationary SVAR and also stationary 
unemployment rate.  
Before estimating our SVAR model we tested the identification restrictions (    
         ), the likelihood ratio test is 0.003 and is not significant when contrasted with 
critical values of the chi-square distribution with three degree of freedom, and the joint 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. The optimal lag length was derived using the AIC and BIC 
criteria, leading to a choice of 2 lags.  When using the official unemployment rates, the 
estimated SVAR coefficients were either statistically insignificant or had the wrong signs.  
                                                          
22 Due to space constraints we do not include the unit root tests, but they are available from the corresponding 
author.  
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In fact, the initial impact of a monetary shock was a reduction of unemployment rate, clearly 
a result that is contrary to economic theory.23  
 
Table 1: SVAR estimates 
(p-values in parenthesis) 
 Unemployment 
Ln (u) 
Domestic demand 
 (y-y*) 
Monetary Policy 
(MCI) 
Ln (u) 
 
 (y-y*) 
 
L(MCI) 
 
US output (q-q*) 
 
Productivity (t) 
 
Fiscal Surplus (g) 
 
Time trend 
 
Dummy95 
 
 
Adjusted (  ) 
0.759 
(0.000) 
-0.061 
(0.090) 
0.024 
(0.064) 
-0.183 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.943) 
0.153 
(0.758) 
0.0008 
(0.884) 
1.766 
(0.012) 
 
0.834 
-0.351 
(0.081) 
0.568 
(0.000) 
-0.067 
(0.007) 
0.293 
(0.036) 
1.809 
(0.000) 
-2.711 
(0.005) 
-0.038 
(0.001) 
-3.138 
(0.018) 
 
0.811 
0.516 
(0.398) 
0.351 
(0.263) 
0.582 
(0.000) 
0.315 
(0.457) 
5.175 
(0.000) 
-7.690 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.744) 
35.167 
(0.000) 
 
0.837 
Log Likelihood -339.93 
Portmanteau(12) 105.1633 (0.1311) 
Source: own estimates. 
Note: The Table contains the sum of the coefficients on the two lags of each variable. Wald test for 
joint significance of both lags of each variable. Wald test for joint significance of both lags of each 
variable. The Portmanteau joint test for white noise residuals is showed. 
 
The estimated SVAR coefficients using the alternative unemployment series are 
reported in Table 1.  As we can see there are no signs of misspecification in any of the 
equations. Table 1 contains the sum of coefficients on the two lags of each variable and the 
Wald test for their joint significance; p-values are in parenthesis.  Results are as expected; a 
tight monetary policy increases unemployment and decreases the domestic demand.  Higher 
domestic demand decreases unemployment. Fiscal surplus decreases the domestic demand 
and the impact on unemployment has the right sign but is not significant.  Shocks on the US 
                                                          
23 In the Appendix we compare results of the impulse response functions for the two unemployment rates.   
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output decreases unemployment and increases domestic demand, while productivity shocks 
increase domestic demand.  
 
6.3 Impulse response functions. 
 
Since we are particularly interested in the effects of monetary policy shocks on the 
unemployment rate; we show in Figure 2 the dynamic response of unemployment and excess 
domestic demand to an exogenous tightening of monetary policy. The results show that 
unemployment responds positively to positive shocks of monetary policy.  This result 
indicates that an exogenous tightening of monetary policy of one percent induces an increase 
of 0.26 percentage points of unemployment after two quarters.  After five years, 
unemployment is still 0.06 percentage points higher than it would have been without the 
shock.  In response to the tight monetary policy, unemployment increases with a 
characteristic hump-shaped pattern as the one found in other studies24.  It reaches its 
maximum effect after three quarters at a level 0.61 points above its original level, and then it 
slowly reverts back to its original level.   
Our results indicate that Mexico’s labor market adjusts quicker than Sweden’s since in 
Alexius and Holmlund (2008)’s study the estimate of a monetary policy shock reaches its 
maximum effect on unemployment after nine quarters.  In a study evaluating the impact of a 
monetary policy shock on unemployment for the US economy, Ravn and Simonelli (2008) 
found that half of the maximum effect of a monetary policy shock on unemployment had 
disappeared after ten quarters and none remained after ten years.   
Hence, an exogenous tightening of monetary policy has less persistent effect on 
unemployment in Mexico than in Sweden and somewhat similar to the one found in the US 
economy.  The reason for the velocity to adjust can be explained by the existence of a large 
informal sector and the existence of a number of schemes that have added some employment 
flexibility despite the heavy regulation that there is in the Mexican formal labor market.  
Labor regulation and labor unions, on the other hand, might explain the low employment 
elasticity to policy shocks.   
                                                          
24  See, for example, Alexius and Holmlund (2008) and Ravn and Simonelli (2008).  
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In short, our results are consistent with previous findings encountered in Latin 
America.25  Unlike those studies however, we argue that the existence of a large informal 
sector and a growing service sector could explain the velocity of adjustment we just found.   
Figure 2 also shows that a contractionary monetary shock has a negative effect on the 
excess domestic demand.  The maximum effect occurs after the first quarter, compared to the 
second quarter for unemployment.  Half of the maximum effect disappears after the seventh 
quarter.  As in unemployment, the estimated impulse response of the domestic excess 
demand reverts back to zero after six years.  This result indicates that when the monetary 
policy is restrictive, output falls, which is logical since real interest rates affect the cost of 
capital and thus consumption and investment.  
In short, the results indicate that an exogenous tightening of monetary policy will 
increase unemployment while contracting output below its potential level.  Our results do 
not necessarily contradict other studies.  Mendoza (2003), for example, found that Mexico 
does not have long run volatility trade-off between output and inflation so that monetary 
policy only affects prices in the long run.   
 
Figure 2: Responses of unemployment and domestic demand 
 
                                                          
25 See for example Loboguerrero and Panizza (2007) and Gonzalez (2002). 
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6.4 Variance decomposition. 
 
Next, we examine the forecast error variance. The forecast error variance 
decomposition tells us the proportion of the movement in a sequence due to its own shocks 
versus shocks to the other variables. Table 2 reports the forecast error variance decomposition 
at the 1, 10, 20 and 30 quarter horizon.  We are interested in the share of movements in 
unemployment that is due to monetary policy shocks and to domestic demand (first row). 
Results indicate that the monetary policy shock accounts for 1 to 26 percent of the fluctuation 
in unemployment depending on the time horizon.  Domestic excess demand shocks account 
for about 5 percent in the short run, while the share falls to 4 percent at longer horizon.  We 
can observe that in the short run, unemployment is explained by its own innovation in about 
93 percent, while the share falls to 69 percent at longer horizon.  
 
Table 2. Variance decomposition 
 Ln u    MCI 
 1 10 20 30 1 10 20 30 1 10 20 30 
Ln u 93.35 71.71 69.71 69.50 5.47 4.28 4.40 4.42 1.17 23.99 25.80 26.07 
   0.00 9.07 11.17 11.40 100 59.34 56.08 55.73 0.00 31.57 32.71 32.85 
MCI 0.00 5.02 6.92 6.88 0.72 4.94 5.04 5.04 99.27 90.02 88.26 88.06 
Source: own estimates 
Figures in the second row are horizons (i,e. quarters); all others figures are estimates rounded to two decimal 
places, so rounding errors may sometimes prevent perfect percentage decomposition. 
 
 
6.5 Robustness. 
 
Given that the SVAR is estimated on a number of specific assumptions, we investigate 
the robustness of our results to variation in these assumptions. Model 1 constitutes our 
Baseline model already reported. Model 2 includes as a measure of monetary policy an MCI 
with derivation of relative weights of interest rate and exchange rate from trade share 
approach by estimating long-rung exports to GDP ratio equation. Based on the AIC and BIC 
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criteria there are arguments in favor of two or three lags so that in our baseline model we 
settled for the more parsimonious model specification, i.e., two lags; hence, model 3 is a 
SVAR model with three lags.  Given that two of the three restrictions we needed to identify 
our SVAR were not theoretically justified, we include in Model 4 the restriction that 
monetary policy does not respond contemporaneously to neither excess demand or 
unemployment (         ), in addition to the assumption that monetary shocks do not 
affect excess demand contemporaneously (       Models 1 through 4 are estimated using the 
alternative unemployment rate.  Model 5 is the baseline model with the official rate of open 
unemployment. 
Figure 3 shows the impulse response function of unemployment to monetary policy 
shocks in our five SVAR specifications.  Except for model five, results are quite robust; the 
effects reach their maximum after two quarters. The magnitude of the maximum effect 
varies between 0.26 and 0.50 percentage points where the response is calculated for a 
monetary policy shock of one standard deviation.  As already noted, estimated coefficients 
when using the official unemployment rate are not consistent with economic theory.  
Another interesting feature of this comparative analysis is that five years after the 
initial shock, unemployment would be between 0.004 and 0.12 percentage point higher that it 
would have been without the shock.  The highest estimated persistence belongs to Model 4, 
where we imposed the restriction that monetary policy will not respond contemporaneously 
to the economy; while the model with the lowest estimated persistence is the model with 
three lags (Model 3).  
  
24 
 
 
Figure 3: Impulse Response function 
 
 
Table 3 reports the forecast error variance decomposition at 1, 10, 20 and 30 quarter 
horizon.  As we can observe, the share of monetary policy shocks in the variance 
decomposition of unemployment are quite robust at 10, 20 and 30 quarter horizon for models 1 
to 4. Results indicate that the monetary policy shocks account for 21 percent at the longer 
horizon in model with three lags while in our base line model accounts for 26 percent.  
Model 5, the one based on the official rate of unemployment deserves special attention.  
Results indicate that an exogenous tightening of monetary policy (shock) of one percentage 
point results in 0.15 percentage point drop of  unemployment contemporaneously; and then 
reaches its maximum effect of 0.18 percentage point higher unemployment after four 
quarters. The estimated impulse response returns to zero after two and a half years.  The 
variance decomposition analysis indicates that official unemployment rates are exogenous 
with respect to monetary policy shocks.  
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Table 3: Unemployment variance decomposition 
 Ln u    MCI 
 1 10 20 30 1 10 20 30 1 10 20 30 
Model 1 93.35 71.71 69.71 69.50 5.47 4.28 4.40 4.42 1.17 23.99 25.80 26.07 
Model 2 90.45 67.35 65.63 65.05 5.88 6.10 6.92 6.95 3.65 26.03 27.43 27.54 
Model 3 97.87 74.45 74.55 74.55 1.21 3.61 3.99 3.99 0.95 21.93 21.45 21.44 
Model 4 38.88 28.82 27.58 27.45 60.33 48.60 48.08 48.03 0.77 22.57 24.32 24.50 
Model 5 88.61 92.14 92.51 92.51 9.28 5.54 5.31 5.30 2.10 2.29 2.17 2.17 
Source: own estimates 
Figures in the first column are the models while figures  in the second row are horizons (i,e. quarters); all others 
figures are estimates rounded to two decimal places, so rounding errors may sometimes prevent perfect 
percentage decomposition. 
 
7. Conclusions   
 
We estimated the impact of macroeconomic stabilization policies on Mexican 
unemployment rates.  The analysis is carried out for two unemployment series, -the official 
rate and an alternative rate estimated following the methodology used by the CPS of the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics-, and for different model specifications.   
When using the official unemployment rates, the impulse response function indicates 
that monetary policy shocks induces an initial drop in unemployment rate of about 0.15 
percentage points.  However, it quickly increases up to 0.18 percentage point by the fourth 
quarter.  But, then unemployment returns to its initial level by the 10th quarter; that is, 
official unemployment rates suggest that Mexican labor market is very fluid.  
When using the alternative unemployment rate, our results indicate that monetary 
policy is no neutral in the short and  medium terms.  The impulse response function suggests 
that the impact of a monetary policy shock on unemployment varies from 0.26 to 0.50 
percentage points under different sets of assumptions.  Another important result is that after 
5 years of the initial shock, unemployment would be between 0.004 and 0.12 percentage points 
higher than it would have been without the shock.  
Variance decomposition analysis complements the impulse response function findings.  
In effect, while the models based on our alternative measure of unemployment suggest that 
monetary policy can explain up to 27 percent of overall variance, the model based on the 
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official unemployment rate indicates that monetary policy can only explain up to 2.2 percent 
of total variations in unemployment!.  Obviously, these results represent a puzzle that needs 
further investigation.   
Our estimates of the unemployment elasticity to monetary shocks suggest that its 
effect on the former is rather low.  However, the velocity of adjustment to such shocks is 
relatively higher than found in European countries, for example.  The low impact of 
monetary policy can be explained by the existence of some institutional rigidity; namely, the 
existence of intrusive labor regulation and labor unions.  These rigidities impede a fuller 
adjustment to policy shocks.  However, there are other elements within the labor market that 
allows, over time, a relatively quick adjustment to such shocks.  Among these elements we 
consider the existence of a large informal sector and a growing service sector where much of 
labor legislation is not enforced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References. 
 
Alcaraz, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2008) “Diferenciales salariales intersectoriales y 
el cambio en la composición del empleo urbano de la economía mexicana en 2001-2004”, 
Banco de México, Working papers No. 2008-06. 
Alcaraz, Carlo (2009) “Informal and Formal Labour Flexibility in Mexico” Desarrollo y 
Sociedad, Primer Semestre de 2009, pp. 115-143.  
27 
 
Alexius, Annika and Bertil Holmlund (2007), “Monetary Policy and Swedish 
Unemployment Fluctuations,” Institute for the Study of Labor, IZA Discussion Paper No 
2933, July.  
Banxico (2002) “Informe sobre la Inflación Octubre – Diciembre 2001”  
http://www.banxico.org.mx/documents/%7B15AA921B-8C80-3651-02F2-
B0AE5A7BB9E6%7D.pdf  
_______________ “Programa Monetario para 2002”, .  
http://www.banxico.org.mx/documents/%7B15AA921B-8C80-3651-02F2-
B0AE5A7BB9E6%7D.pdf  
Blanchard, Oliver and Diamond P. (1989), “The Beveridge Curve.” Brooking Papers on 
Economic Activity I, 1-60 
Blanchard, Oliver, and D. Quah (1989), “The Dynamic Effect of Aggregated Demand 
and Supply Disturbances,” American Economic Review, vol. 79, 655-673 
Cantillon, Richard (1732-34) “Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Generale” first 
published in 1755.  
Chavarin, R. (2001)  “El costo del desempleo medido en producto. Una revisión 
empírica de la ley de Okun para México”, El trimestre Económico. Vol. LXVIII, Núm. 270, 
FCE, México.  
Chick, Victoria (1983) “Macroeconomics after Keynes: A Reconsideration of The 
General Theory” Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Fisher, (1911) “The Purchasing Power of Money,”   
Fleck, Susan and Sorrentino, Constance (1994) “Employment and Unemployment in 
Mexico´s Labor Force”, Monthly Labor Review, November.  
Friedman, Milton (1968) “The role of Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review, 
March, Vol. 68, pp. 1-17.  
Friedman, Milton (1976) “Inflation and Unemployment,” Nobel Memorial Lecture, 
December 13, 1976.  
Gaytán, Alejandro and Jesus Gonzalez (2006) “Structural Changes in the Transmission 
Mechanism of Monetary Policy in Mexico: A Non-linear VAR Approach”, Jesus Gonzalez-
Garcia, April 2006, Banco de Mexico Working Paper No. 2006-06 
28 
 
Gill, Indermit; Claudio E. Montenegro and Dörte Dömeland, editors (2001) “Crafting 
Labor Policy: Techniques and Lessons Learned from Latin America” The World Bank, 
Washington D. C. 
Gonzalez-Anaya, José Antonio (2002) “Labor Market Flexibility in Thirteen Latin 
American Countries and the United States: Revisiting and Expanding Okun Coefficients”, 
Center For Research On Economic Development And Policy Reform, Stanford University, 
June. 
Grier, Robin and Kevin B. Grier (2006) “On the real effects of inflation and inflation 
uncertainty in Mexico”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 80, pp. 478-500.  
Heckman, James and Carmen Pagés (2000), “The Cost of Job Security Regulation: 
Evidence From Latin American Labor Markets”, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
NBER Working Paper No 7773, June. 
Heckman, James and Carmen Pagés (2001), “The Cost of Job Security Regulation: 
Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets”, Economía, Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2000, 
pp. 109-144, Published by Brookings Institution Press 
Hume, [1752] “On Money” published as Essays: moral, political and literary, (1985) ed. 
Miller, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund.  
 
Hyford, M.D. (2005), “Fiscal Policy and National Saving,” Applied Economics, vol. 37, 
981-992. 
Hyeon-Seung, H. (2005), “A simple test of exogeneity for recursively structural VAR 
model”, Applied Economics, 37, 2307-2313 
Lipsey, Richard (1960) “The relation between unemployment and the rate of change of 
money wage rates in the United Kingdom, 1862-1957: a further analysis”, Economica New 
Series, Vol. 27, Num. 105, pp. 1-31. 
Loboguerrero, Ana Maria and Ugo Panizza (2009) Macroeconomic Shocks, Inflation, 
and Latin America's Labor Market, Kiel Institute for World Economics,  
Loria, E. and Ramos, M. (2007) “La ley de Okun: Una relectura para México, 1970-
2004”, Estudios Económicos, Vol. 22, Núm. 001, 19-55   
 
29 
 
Lucas Jr., Robert E. (1973) "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation 
Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 
326-34, June. 
Maloney, William (2009) “Mexican labor markets: protection, productivity and power” 
in Santiago Levy and Michael Walton, editors No Growth without Equity?: Inequality, 
Interests and Competition in Mexico.  
Marshall, Adriana (2004) “Labour market policies and regulations in Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico: Programmes and impacts”, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y 
Técnicas and Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
Martin, Gary (2000) “Employment and Unemployment in Mexico in the 1990s” 
Monthly Labor Review, November, pp. 3-18.  
Mendoza, Alfonso (2003), “The inflation-output volatility tradeoff and exchange rate 
shocks in Mexico and Turkey”, Central Bank Review, vol. I, pp. 27-51. 
Messmacher M. and Werner A. (2002), “La Política Monetaria en México: 1950-2000,” 
Gaceta de Economía, ITAM. Tomo I, 19-59 
Newcomb, Simon (1885) “Principles of Political Economy”, New York, Harper and 
Brothers, Franklin Square.    
Pastor, J. and Villagómez A. (2007), The Structural Budget Balance: A Preliminary 
Estimation for Mexico, Applied Economics, vol. 39, 1599-1607. 
Phillips, A. W. (1958) “The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of 
Change of MoneyWages in the United Kingdom 1861–1957.” Economica 25 (November): 283–
99. 
Ravn, M. and S. Simonelly (2008), “Labor Market Dynamics and the Business Cycle: 
Structural Evidence for the United States,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 109(4), 
743-777. 
Revenga, Ana and Riboud, Michelle (1993) “Unemployment in Mexico: its 
characteristics and determinants”, Policy Research Working Paper No 1230, The World 
Bank, December. 
Risso, W. Adrián and Edgar J. Sanchez (2009) "Inflation and Mexican economic 
growth: long-run relation and threshold effects," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 
Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 1(3), pages 246-263, May 
30 
 
Shapiro, M. D. and Watson, M. (1988), “Sources of Business Cycle Fluctuations,” 
Stanley Fischer, e.d., NBER Macroeconomics Annual. Cambridge, Mass.: Press. 
Samuelson, Paul and Robert Solow (1960) “Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation 
Policy”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the 
Seventy -second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1960), pp. 
177-194.  
Sanchez, Manuel (2005), “The Recent Stabilization Experience in Mexico,” Cato 
Journal, vol.25, No. 1, 55-77. 
Sims, C. A. (1980), “Macroeconomics and Reality,” Econometrica, vol.48, 1-49 
Taylor J. (1994) “The Inflation/Output Variability Trade-off Revisited”, in Goals, 
Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary PolicyMakers. Proceedings of the Conference 
Series No. 38, pages 21–38. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
 
  
31 
 
Appendix 
Table A1: SVAR estimates 
(p-values in parenthesis) 
 Unemployment 
Ln (u) 
Domestic demand 
 (y-y*) 
Monetary Policy 
(MCI) 
Ln (u) 
 
 (y-y*) 
 
L(MCI) 
 
US output (q-q*) 
 
Productivity (t) 
 
Fiscal Surplus (g) 
 
Lag_inf 
 
Time trend 
 
Dummy95 
 
 
Adjusted (  ) 
0.761 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.919) 
0.025 
(0.081) 
-0.184 
(0.015) 
-0.026 
(0.918) 
0.105 
(0.869) 
-0.0005 
(0.905) 
0.0009 
(0.878) 
1.763 
(0.013) 
 
0.831 
-0.369 
(0.072) 
0.562 
(0.000) 
-0.073 
(0.007) 
0.300 
(0.036) 
1.894 
(0.000) 
-3.149 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.563) 
-0.037 
(0.002) 
-3.107 
(0.020) 
 
0.809 
0.837 
(0.133) 
0.246 
(0.382) 
0.689 
(0.000) 
0.188 
(0.621) 
3.645 
(0.008) 
-15.615 
(0.000) 
-0.084 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.498) 
34.596 
(0.000) 
 
0.869 
Log Likelihood -331.18 
Portmanteau(12) 107.1656 (0.1411) 
Source: own estimates. 
Note: The Table contains the sum of the coefficients on the two lags of each variable. Wald test for 
joint significance of both lags of each variable. Wald test for joint significance of both lags of each 
variable. The Portmanteau joint test for white noise residuals is showed. 
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Figure A1. Impulse response function of a monetary shock 
 
Source: own estimates 
Impulse responses of alternative and official unemployment from a one standard deviation shock to 
monetary policy 
 
 
